This paper puts forth a class of algebraic structures, relativized Boolean algebras (RBAs), that provide semantics for propositional logic in which truth/validity is only defined relative to a local domain. In particular, the join of an event and its complement need not be the top element. Nonetheless, behavior is locally governed by the laws of propositional logic. By further endowing these structures with operators-akin to the theory of modal Algebras-RBAs serve as models of modal logics in which truth is relative. In particular, modal RBAs provide semantics for various well known awareness logics.
Introduction
In many logical settings, it is desirable that truth and validity are not defined globally, but relative to some local domain. For example, one may not want to discuss the properties of objects when they do not exist, or the necessity, knowledge, or obligation of statements when they are not defined. However, we may still want the logic to behave in a classical manor when examined locally, that is, when fixing the domain.
This relative definition of truth has become commonplace in the epistemic formalization of (un)awareness, where an agent's reasoning is restricted by her awareness but is otherwise rational. This paper puts forth a class of algebraic structures, relativized Boolean algebras (RBAs), that provide semantics for propositional logic in which truth is only defined relative to a local domain, but within a given domain behavior is classical. By further endowing these structures with operators-akin to the theory of modal algebras or Figure 1 : The RBA from Example 1. The arrows indicate the partial ordering ≥. The blue elements compose B, and the red elements, R.
Boolean algebras with operators-RBAs serve as models of modal logics in which truth is relative. In particular, RBAs with operators provide semantics for various well known awareness logics.
Like a Boolean algebra and RBA is a set endowed with meet, join, and negation operations, and bottom and top elements: RB = RB, ∧, ∨, ¬, 0, 1 . These operations satisfy the axioms of Boolean algebras except X ∨ ¬X, which we denote by 1 X , need not be the top element, and 0 need not be the identify for ∨. The elements of RBAs can be ordered via the usual condition Y ≥ X iff X ∧ Y = X.
In place of the Boolean axioms are the weakened versions X ∨1 = 1 X and X ∧0 = 0.
Theorem 1 shows that under these two conditions π 1 (X) = {Z | 1 Z = 1 X } is itself a Boolean algebra. Hence, if we think of π 1 (X) as the domain on which the truth of X is defined, then within a domain, truth behaves classically. Additionally, RBAs satisfy one additional property: 1 Y ≥ 1 X implies ¬(Y ∧ 1 X ) = ¬Y ∧ 1 X . This final property ensures that if Y ≥ X then Z → Z ∧ 1 X is a Boolean homomorphism from π 1 (Y ) to π 1 (X). Hence, RBAs are naturally equipped with an ordering on domains and a sense of projection between them. Consider the proposition p representing "cryptographic protocol x is insecure" and q representing "there is a quantum algorithm breaking protocol x." Associate p to the event X B and q to the event X R . Then RB models the situation in which p is always
Then, although q → p is defined only when both q and p are (hence on R), it is still valid in the particular sense that it is true whenever it is defined.
Just as powersets serve as concrete examples of Boolean algebras, given a set W , we can defined a concrete RBA over
and with operations defined by
Theorem 2 is a Stone-like representation theorem, showing that every RBA can be embedded into a concrete RBA. This inclusion, for the RBA considered in Example 1 is shown in Figure 2 .
As hinted at in Example 1, RBAs serve as models of propositional logic in which truth and validity are relative by considering a homomorphism, h : L → RB, between a propositional language, L, and an RBA (i.e., a map such that h(¬ϕ) = ¬h(ϕ), 
RBAs and Awareness
There are two interrelated methods of capturing awareness within a formal epistemology. First are the models that capture awareness semantically, where knowledge and awareness is understood in terms of the subsets of a set called a state-space [2; 8; 11] .
Second are models that capture awareness syntacticly, where knowledge and awareness are understood in terms of statements about the world [3; 12; 1; 5]. 2
In state-space models, knowledge and awareness are represented by operators, f K and f A that map events (subsets of the state-space) to events. The event that an agent knows E is f K (E); and that she is aware of event E is f A (E). Dekel et al. [2] showed that under mild and intuitive conditions on these operators, the only possibility was being aware of everything or nothing.
To circumvent this impossibility result, Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper [8] (HMS) 2 There have also been several papers examining the connection/equivalence between extant models of the two approaches [7; 9] . and Li [11] consider an ordered set of state-spaces. State-spaces higher in the ordering project onto the lower spaces, in the sense that they are strictly more expressive. Then, roughly, an agent in state ω is aware of those events which are in state-spaces lower in the ordering than the space containing ω. By considering multiple state-spaces, the definition of truth becomes inherently relative: there are states in which neither an event nor its complement obtain. Nonetheless, when restricted to events in a particular state-space, behavior is classical.
Syntactic models of awareness, conversely, are necessarily contingent on a logical language, L, with two modalities A and K, respectively. The truth of formulas is then To accommodate reasoning about knowledge (and awareness), we can enrich an RBA, RB, with an operator, a function f K : RB → RB. The interpretation is as in the state-space models, or indeed in the more general theory of modal algebras: f K (X) is the element representing knowledge of the element X. We require that f K respects meets, maps the top element to itself, and that f K (X) ∈ π 1 (X). The first two conditions represent the standard properties of modalities in normal modal logics: the K axiom and necessitation, respectively. The final requirement constitutes that knowledge of an element must be defined in the same domain as the element itself. From f K we can define f A , representing awareness, as f A (X) = f K (1 X ). The definition of f A , in addition to ensuring that awareness is domain specific, also embodies a weakened form of necessitation: the agent knows all (and only) tautologies she is aware of.
Example 2. Take the RBA from Example 1 and consider the map, f K : RB → RB as given by
and which coincides with the identity map everywhere else. This is visualized by the left side of Figure 3 . Then f A is simply the map W → 1 W .
Going back to our propositions p and q, from example 1, f K represents the state of affairs in which an agent who is aware of quantum computers (i.e., is aware of q) is necessarily uncertain about the security of the protocol (i.e., does not know p). This is because the two elements resolving the truth of p and representing awareness of q, and Kripke frames are equivalent. For every modal RBA there is an awareness frame that models the same theories and that constructed out of its ultrafilters. Conversely, for every awareness frame there is a modal RBA constructed from the powerset of its worlds and that models the same theories. For example, the concrete RBA that embeds the RBA from Example 1, itself visualized in Figure 2 , models the same theories as the Kripke frame shown on the right side of Figure 3 .
Stringing these constructions together, we obtain a version of the celebrated representation theorem of Jonnson and Tarski [10] , that every modal RBA can be isomorphically embedded into the (modal) concrete RBA constructed from its corresponding ultrafilter frame. Along the way this shows that the (propositionally generated) awareness logics considered by Fagin and Halpern [3] are complete and sound with respect to the class of modal RBAs.
2 Relativized Boolean Algebras
Preliminaries / Definitions
Call A = A, ∧, ∨, ¬, 0, 1 an algebra of Boolean similarity type when A is a set, 0, 1 ∈ A, ∧ and ∨ are binary operations taking A × A → A, referred to as the meet and join, receptively, and ¬ is a unary operation taking A → A referred to as the
If A is an algebra whose elements are partially ordered by ≥, then a filter, u, on
An ultrafilter is a filter that (v) is strongly proper and there is no strongly proper filter, v on A such that u is a proper subset of v. Let F (A) and U (A) denote the set of filters and ultrafilters on A. 3 Of special importance is the class of Boolean algebras (whose elements are generically referred to as B) that satisfy the axioms of Boolean algebras (see for example [14] ), written here for connivence:
ba1. ∧ and ∨ are associative, communicative, and distributive.
ba2. X ∨ ¬X = 1
ba3. X ∧ ¬X = 0.
ba4. X ∨ 0 = X ∧ 1 = X.
Let BA denote the class of Boolean Algebras. The operations induce a partial ordering
in the definition of an ultrafilter is, for Boolean algebras, equivalent to: for all X ∈ B either X ∈ u or ¬X ∈ u, but not both.
Relativized Boolean Algebras
An algebra of Boolean similarity type, RB = RB, ∧, ∨, ¬, 0, 1 , is a relativized Boolean algebra if it satisfies the laws below. To expedite their description, set the
rb1. ∧ and ∨ are associative, communicative, and distributive and with ¬ satisfy DeMorgan's laws.
Let RBA denote the class of relativized Boolean algebras. It is immediate from (rb2) and (rb4) that 1 ≥ X ≥ 0 for all X. Notice, however, that unlike in Boolean
For a Boolean algebra, X ∨ ¬X = 1 irrespective of X, so the join is global, in the sense that the join of an element and its complement is greater than any other element.
Likewise X ∧ ¬X = 0 for all X. As the name betrays, for a relativized Boolean algebra, the meet and join operations are relative, in the sense that their identities, i.e., 1 X and 0 X , depend on the elements on which they are acting. Theorem 1, below, establishes that the operations of a RBA will obey the laws of Boolean algebras locally, within the set of elements which have the same operational identities. That is: π 1 (X) forms a Boolean algebra. Moreover, the set these local Boolean structures themselves form a semi-lattice on which the projections maps are homomorphisms.
Lemma 1. The following are true for all RB ∈ RBA.
(i) ≥ is a weak order.
Theorem 1. For each X, π 1 (X) = {Z ∈ RB | 1 Z = 1 X } is a Boolean Algebra (with 1 X and 0 X as the top and bottom elements, and the inherited operations). Moreover,
former is an algebra with 1 and 0 X as the top and bottom elements, and the inherited operations).
Proof. That π 1 (X) is closed under ¬, ∧, and ∨ is immediate. That these relations
Next, consider the map h X . Lemma 1(iv) states that the image of h X is indeed
The case for ∨ is identical.
Concrete Relativized Boolean Algebras
Just as the powerset of a set forms the prototypical example of a BA, RBAs can also be given If u is a filter of RB, then let π 2 (u) = u ∩ π 2 (RB) and π 1 (u, X) = u ∩ π 1 (X).
With these definitions, we can can define the following filters on RB, which may not be ultrafilters themselves but whose projections are either empty or are ultrafilters.
F RB = {u ∈ F (RB) | π 1 (u, X) ∈ U (π 1 (X)), for all X ∈ π 2 (u)}. 4 If B = ∅ then we have the trivial algebra where 0 = 1, but this is no problem.
The following Lemma establishes that we can extend any suitable filter to an element of F RB . Using this construction, Theorem 2 shows that every RB ∈ RBA can be embedded into the concrete RBA based on the set F RB . This clearly mirrors the standard results for representing a Boolean algebra in the powerset of its ultrafilters.
Here, however, the filters we must work with are not ultrafilters, since π 2 (RB) need not be a Boolean algebra (for example, for a given 1 X , there may be no 1 Y such that
Lemma 2. Let F ∈ F (RB) be strongly proper and let X / ∈ F . Then F can be extended to u ∈ F RB such that π 2 (F ) = π 2 (u) and X / ∈ u.
is an injective homomorphism. Finally to see that h is injective, assume X = Y . If 1 X = 1 Y then assume without 
Models of Propositional Logic
For P, a set of propositional variables, let L(P) be the language defined by the grammar ϕ :
where p ∈ P. We employ the standard logical abbreviations: 0 ≡ ¬1, (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and (ϕ → ψ) ≡ (¬ϕ ∨ ψ). For ϕ ∈ L(P) let P(ϕ) collect those propositional variables which are subformula of ϕ.
In an abuse of notation, we let L(P) also denote the algebra of Boolean similarity type in which the base set is L(P) itself and the meet, join, and complement operations and the top and bottom elements being denoted by their grammatical counterparts. This is the free algebra of Boolean similarity type generated by P.
Say that ϕ ∈ L(P) is valid in RBA, denoted RBA |= ϕ, if for all RB ∈ RBA and all homomorphisms h : L(P) → RB we have that h(ϕ) = 1 X for some X ∈ B. Proof. For RB ∈ RBA, let h : L(P) → RB and let h(ϕ) = X for some classical validity, ϕ. Note that for all subformula, ψ, of ϕ, it must be that 1 h (ψ) ≥ 1 X (this is the consequence of Lemma 1). Now, define the homomorphism h : L(P) → π 1 (X) via:
By Theorem 1, it must be that for all subformula, ψ, of ϕ, that h (ψ) = (h(ψ) ∧ 1 X ) = h X (h(ψ)) ∈ π 1 (X).
Since ϕ is a theorem of classical logic and h is a homomorphism to π 1 (X) ∈ BA, it must be that h (ϕ) = 1 X , and hence h(ϕ) = 1 X as desired.
Completeness follows from Remark 1.
Awareness Logics
Let L A,K (P) denote the extension of L(P) to include the modalities A and K:
Consider the following axioms, all of which are standard, and whose merits and interpretations are discussed in the literature cited in the introduction.
Axioms:
AGP. Aϕ → Aψ, for all ψ ∈ L A,K (P(ϕ)).
A0. Kϕ → Aϕ.
KA. Aϕ ↔ KAϕ.
Rules of Inference:
MP. From ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ (modus ponens).
Sub. From ϕ infer all of its substitution instances.
Nec K . From ϕ infer Kϕ.
Let AX denote the smallest logic containing the tautologies of propositional logic and AGP ∪ K ∪ D ∪ A0 and which is closed under MP, Sub, and Nec AK . AX is the axiom system considered in [3] when awareness is generated by primitive propositions and when the accessibility relation is serial. 5 
Awareness Frames and Awareness Models
A awareness frame is a pre-ordered set (W, ≥) endowed with a serial binary relation, R. We will set R(ω) = {ω ∈ Ω | ωRω }. Although we refer to the elements of W as worlds or states, note they will not have the standard interpretation of specifying the truth of all formulas, but will rather model only a subset of the language.
A awareness model for the language L A,K (P) is a awareness frame, (W, ≥, R) along with two functions, L : P → P(W ) and V : P → P(W ) such (i) L(p) is ≥ upwards closed, and (ii) V (p) ⊆ L(p) for all p ∈ P. Abusing notation let L A,K (ω) = L A,K (L(ω)) specify the language at world ω. It is the content of (i) that if ω ≥ ω then L A,K (ω) ⊇ L A,K (ω ).
An awareness model M = (W, ≥, R, L, V ) defines, at every ω ∈ W the truth of all formula in L A,K (ω). Truth is defined recursively via the operator |= as 5 Our inclusion of D will, as usual, specify those models where the accessibility relation is serial. There is no intrinsic problem considering a weaker logic without D (and therefore without any restriction on the accessibility relation), but to obtain a complete and sound axiomatization, we must replace it with a novel axiom: K0 → Aϕ. 
Let MRBA denote the class of modal RBAs. From f K we can define the additional
These conditions reflect the properties of knowledge and awareness in relation to the elements where they are defined: (f1) states that knowledge (and awareness) of an element is defined exactly when the event itself is defined; (f2) reflects our weakened form of necessitation: something which is tautological and always defined is always known; (f3) encodes the distributive property of knowledge. As always, we have that (f3) implies that f K is monotone. Finally, (fD) instantiates our restriction to nontrivial knowledge as D did in frame semantics.
If (RB, f K ) is a MRBA and h : L(P) → RB is a homomorphism we can extend
for all (RB, f K ) ∈ MRBA and all homomorphisms from h : L(P) → RB we have that h + (ϕ) = 1 X for some X ∈ RB.
The proof of Theorem 5 is the conjunction of the following two propositions. Proposition 6 constructs, for each awareness model, a corresponding MRBA (and homomorphism) such that for each formula, (V (ϕ), L(ϕ)) = h + (ϕ). Then, in converse fashion, Proposition 7 constructs an awareness model, for each (RB, f K , h), such that h + (ϕ) = (V (ϕ), L(ϕ)).
Powerset MRBAs
If F = (W, ≥, R) is an awareness frame, define the concrete MRBA, (2W, f K,R ) and
Verifying that f K,R here defined satisfies (f1)-(f3) is straight forward. (fD) follows from the assumption that R is serial. Proof. This is done by induction of the structure of formula. We show the inductive step for Kϕ:
The second equality is our inductive hypothesis. I promise, the other steps are even simpler.
Proposition 6 proves that MRBA |= ϕ implies AM |= ϕ. To see this, notice that if MRBA |= ϕ then for every (RB, f K ), and for every homomorphism h : L(P) → RB, we have h + (ϕ) = 1 X for some X ∈ RB. In particular, for each model (F, L, V ) this is true for 2W and h M : p → (V (p), L(p)). Thus, Proposition 6 requires that V (ϕ) = L(ϕ).
Since this holds for all models, we have that ϕ is valid in AM.
Ultrafilter Frames
In dual fashion, the next Proposition shows that AM |= ϕ implies MRBA |= ϕ by constructing an awareness model for each (RB, f K , h) that yield the same validities.
As usual, the worlds will be sets of ultrafilter like objects. By the reasoning outlined in Section 2, we consider the filters F RB = {u ∈ F (RB) | π 1 (u, X) ∈ U (π 1 (X)), for all X ∈ π 2 (u)}.
Then, if (RB, f K ) ∈ MRBA, define the ultrafilter frame as (P(F RB ),
Proposition 7. Let h : L(P) → RB be a homomorphism and h + its extension to
Proof. As always, the proof is by induction on the structure of formula. This is straightforward with the help of the following lemma:
Proof. The if direction is immediate given the definition of R. We show the only if via its contrapositive: if f K (X) / ∈ u then there exists some v ∈ F RB such that f K (X ) ∈ u implies X ∈ v and X / ∈ v.
We first show that for all ϕ, L h (ϕ) = {v ∈ F RB | 1 h + (ϕ) ∈ v}. This is by induction of the complexity of ϕ. The base case is the definition of L. We will show the cases for ∧ and K (negation is trivial and the argument for A is exactly the argument for K).
Let u ∈ L h (ϕ ∧ ψ). So, ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ L(u) iff ϕ ∈ L(u) and ψ ∈ L(u). By the inductive hypothesis, this is iff 1 h + (ϕ) ∈ u and 1 h + (ψ) ∈ u. Since u ∈ F RB , this is iff
Let u ∈ L h (Kϕ). So, Kϕ ∈ L(u) iff ϕ ∈ L(u). By the inductive hypothesis, this is
Where the second equality is via (f1).
Next, we show that for all ϕ, 
To see that Proposition 7 shows that AM |= ϕ implies MRBA |= ϕ (and thus completes the proof of Theorem 5), let ϕ be valid in AM and pick your favorite MRBA,
(RB, f K ) and homomorphism h : L(P) → RB. Then in particular, ϕ is valid in
which can only be true if h + (ϕ) = 1 h + (ϕ) , indicating validity in (RB, h).
A Example 3
Let RB consist of the union of the elements of Boolean Algebras, B (for blue) and
R (for red), generated by the sets {Y B , ¬Y B } and {X R , ¬X R }, respectively. Moreover, Notice that π R (B) = R but rather is the trivial 0 − 1 algebra.
B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. To show completeness, we follows the usual con- Proof. Since Γ contains AGP, we have that {ψ | Aψ ∈ Γ} = L A,K (Q ) for some Q ⊂ P. Since Aϕ / ∈ Γ, ϕ / ∈ L A,K (Q ). Set Γ − = {ψ | Kψ ∈ Γ}. By A0, Γ − ⊆ L A,K (Q ), and by D, Γ − = L A,K (Q ). Notice also that, by Nec AK , we have that Γ − contains all tautologies in L A,K (Q). This allows for the standard argument that Γ − is a consistent set of formulas and can therefore be extended to a maximally consistent set, Γ ⊂ L A,K (Q ). (Γ , Q ) is the desired world. Proof. There are two cases to consider. First, if Aϕ / ∈ Γ, then by Lemma 4, there is an assessable world, (Γ , Q ), such that ϕ / ∈ L A,K (Q ), and hence clearly, ϕ / ∈ Γ .
So assume that Aϕ ∈ Γ. Since Γ contains AGP, we have that {ψ | Aψ ∈ Γ} = L A,K (Q ) for some Q ⊆ P. Then consider the set Γ − = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | Kψ ∈ Γ}. Since Γ contains A0, we have that Γ − ⊆ L A,K (Q ). As usual, Γ − can be extended to a maximally consistent set, Γ in L A,K (Q ). Again, (Γ , Q ) is the desired world.
C Other Proofs Omitted from the Main Text
Proof of Lemma 1. Parts (i-iii) are immediate from definitions.
where the elimination of negations comes from the fact that X ∨ 1 = X ∨ ¬X = ¬X ∨ 1 via commutativity and (rb3).
Proof of Lemma 2. We will show that if F ∈ F (RB) is strongly proper, then for all 1 X ∈ π 2 (F ), ¬X / ∈ F then F = {Z ∧ Y | Z ≥ X, Y ∈ F } is in F (RB) and is strongly proper and π 2 (F ) = π 2 (F ) and ¬X / ∈ F . This suffices, since we can then appeal to the usual Zornesque arguments, to choose a maximal element of the partial order of all extensions.
That F is upwards closed, contains 1, and is closed under intersections is immediate.
Thus, we need only show that F is strongly proper. Assume to the contrary that Z ∧ Y = 0 W for some W ∈ RB with Z ≥ X and Y ∈ F . Then {1 Z , 1 Y } ∈ F and so to
Now, (Z ∧ 1 V ) ≥ (X ∧ 1 V ), the fact that π 1 (V ) ∈ BA and (1) requires that ¬(X ∧ 1 V ) ≥ (Y ∧ 1 V ). But, since F was upwards closed, this requires that ¬X ∈ F , since ¬X ≥ ¬X ∧ 1 V = ¬(X ∧ 1 V ) (by (rb5)). This contradicts our assumption.
Clearly, π 2 (F ) ⊆ π 2 (F ), so to see the other direction, let Z ∧ Y = 1 W for some W ∈ RB with Z ≥ X and Y ∈ F . Then by Lemma 1(v), 1 W = 1 Z ∧ 1 Y ≥ 1 X ∧ 1 Y and so 1 W ∈ π 2 (F ).
